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ay last Editor’s Page dealt with physician self-referral in
ardiology, a situation which raises potential conflict of
nterest issues that are both real and perceived. Heart
ospitals are a relatively new type of medical facility on the
ealthcare landscape, and they typically involve partial
wnership by physicians. As with physician self-referral,
eart hospitals offer a number of attractive benefits to
ealthcare delivery but also raise concerns about possible
onflict of interest and adverse effects upon community
ospitals. In a sense, heart hospitals not only embody many
f the issues of self-referral, but also larger issues involving
he role of cardiovascular services within the universe of
edical care.
The term “heart hospital” has been used to describe a
ariety of facilities ranging from stand-alone institutions to
hospitals within hospitals.” Some are affiliated with general
ospital systems, whereas some are financially independent
nd partner with for-profit entities. The specialty hospitals
hat have attracted the greatest attention and concern share
he characteristics described by a report of the U.S. General
ccounting Office (GAO) (1). These hospitals are stand-
lone facilities usually devoted to the narrow spectrum of
iseases of one organ system, and they nearly always
ncompass partial physician ownership. Most specialty hos-
itals are devoted to cardiovascular diseases, orthopedics, or
urgery—services that usually generate surplus revenues
read profits) for general hospitals. According to the GAO
urvey, 70% of facilities have physician ownership amount-
ng to an average ownership of 50% of the hospital,
lthough the average share for any individual physician was
bout 2%. Nearly all specialty hospitals were at least partially
wned by group practices. Not surprisingly, the combina-
ion of physician ownership and profitable services raises the
pecter of potential self-referral and conflict of interest.
Although comprising 2% of acute-care hospitals na-
ionwide, specialty hospitals have burst upon the medical
cene with rapid growth. Thus, the number of specialty
ospitals tripled between 1990 and 2003 to a total of 90
acilities, with 20 in the planning stage (1). Seventeen of
hese hospitals were cardiac, with five more on the drawing
oard. A search of the term “heart hospital” on Google
ields more than 10 pages of listings. In fact, the increased
umber and potential impact of heart and other specialty
ospitals was sufficiently great that the Medicare Modern-
zation Act of 2003 placed an 18-month moratorium uponhe exemption that these facilities were granted from the
tark Medicare Physician Self-Referral Law.
The concept of specialty hospitals is certainly not new.
ospitals devoted to pediatrics, women’s health, and psy-
hiatry have existed for many years. However, these facilities
re usually not physician owned and they are generally
irected at specific patient populations rather than diseases.
he recent growth of heart and other specialty hospitals has
een facilitated by several factors (2). The improvement in
edical procedures and anesthesia has enabled care delivery
o be streamlined. Health plans have been less selective in
ontracting. Many general hospitals have been operating
ear full census. From a financial standpoint, profits have
een available from reimbursement, as has capital from
or-profit firms such as MedCath. It is of interest that heart
nd other specialty hospitals have nearly always been located
n areas with weak or absent Certificate of Need rules,
hich contain large medical groups with which to affiliate.
The proponents of heart hospitals cite a number of
dvantages for these institutions. Their focus upon disease
f one organ system and the anticipated increased volume of
hese disorders treated should result in greater quality of
are. Staff, management, and equipment dedicated to a
pecific set of disorders should result in greater efficiency of
are. Thus, one would expect heart hospitals to reduce costs
nd increase the number of patients a physician can care for,
n important consideration with an impending shortage of
ardiologists. The greater physician input into and control
f heart hospitals is seen as a great advantage to effective and
fficient operations. Finally, the above efficiency along with
he perceived convenience of smaller heart hospitals should
esult in greater patient satisfaction.
Despite these advantages, the proliferation of heart and
pecialty hospitals has produced a chorus of concerns. To
egin with, heart hospitals carry the potential for an excess
apacity of beds and services with the financial impact which
hat implies. Excess capacity along with the potential
ncentives of self-referral could result in overutilization. The
ivision of patients between more institutions could lead to
ecreased volumes and quality at all facilities. Finally, duties
t specialty hospitals may make specialists unavailable to
over emergencies at general hospitals.
Those opposed to heart hospitals point out that they
ould have a substantial negative financial impact upon
eneral hospitals. Cardiovascular procedures are profitable
nd subsidize money-losing but necessary community hos-
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Editor’s Page May 19, 2004:1923–4ital services such as burn units. Syphoning off this profit
ould injure general hospitals. Moreover, some worry that
eart and specialty hospitals skim the most financially
ttractive types of medical practice. They are often suspected
f providing only the most profitable services to patients
ho may have less complicated illnesses in an environment
hat may be less regulated. Because many of these facilities
o not have emergency departments, they may avoid caring
or the very sick and the very poor. In addition, physician
nvestors may be biased to send their most complex and
nusual patients to general hospitals. Given this litany of
oncerns, it is perhaps understandable that a moratorium
as recently placed on exemptions to the Stark Law for new
pecialty hospitals.
As is so often the case, there is a dearth of data to validate
ither the advantages or liabilities of heart and specialty
ospitals. The GAO studied approximately 25% of such
nstitutions and reported that the severity of illness was less
n specialty than in general hospitals (1). However, a study
y Al Dobson of the Lewin Group funded by MedCath
eported that their heart hospitals had a greater case-mix
everity, lower mortality, and lesser length of stay than did
eer community hospitals (3). Although some community
ospitals have claimed significant financial losses due to
pecialty hospitals, it has been pointed out that no general
ospital has closed because of such competition. Interest-
ngly, the absence of data has in no way lessened the volume
f the debate.
Given the current questions regarding heart and specialty
ospitals, Casalino et al. (2) have identified several potential
ourses of action that might be warranted in the future. If
uture data show that heart hospitals have resulted in neither
n adverse effect on general hospitals nor overutilization,
hen no action should be taken. If specialty hospitals provide
ore efficient or better care and hurt community hospitals
n the process, but the competition is fair and “cherry
icking” is not found, it would not seem reasonable to take
ny adverse action against them. Rather reimbursement
ight be adjusted to reflect the costs incurred by general
ospitals in providing nonremunerative but necessary ser-
ices such as burn units. Conversely, if specialty hospitals
dversely affect general hospitals owing to unfair competi-
ion and patient selection, then it would seem justified to
nclude specialty hospitals in the provision of the Stark
edicare, Physician Self-Referral Law, which prohibits
elf-referral, or to adjust payment to reflect care mix. Of
ignificance, the concerns regarding specialty hospitals have
gain focused attention on why some medical services are
uch more remunerative than others. Major revision of theurrent Medicare relative value system might, of course,ave more profound consequences upon cardiovascular
edicine than heart hospitals ever could.
And so, as the movement toward heart hospitals gathers
omentum, both the concerns and the debate about pos-
ible adverse effects continue. General hospitals worry that
rocedures which generate financial surpluses will be lost
nd unavailable to fund important nonremunerative services
uch as burn units, trauma care, and social services. In
ddition, they are concerned that physician ownership may
ias decision making and lead to the referral of only
ow-severity, well-funded patients to heart hospitals. Pro-
onents of specialty hospitals counter that such concerns
elie a basic mistrust of doctors, and that physicians will
lways make the best decision regardless of self-interest (4).
he data are not available to resolve the issues. Neverthe-
ess, it seems to me that physicians are somewhat naive to
elieve that they can dismiss concerns regarding the obvious
otential for conflict of interest that heart hospitals present
y merely saying “trust me.” The recommendation of the
ask Force on New Niche Medical Facilities of the Amer-
can Hospital Association to eliminate the whole hospital
xemption to the Stark Law for specialty hospitals is
vidence of this naivety. If physician ownership is too small
nd potential dividends too inconsequential to influence
ecision making, perhaps physicians should consider donat-
ng these financial gains to some worthwhile cause. In this
ay they could preserve the important aspect of physician
nput and control of the facility as investors while defusing
ny issue of self-referral.
Finally, as cardiologists, we must realize that the percep-
ion of conflict of interest is often as significant as its
xistence. We should act aggressively to remove any per-
eption of conflict of interest in our decision making, or
omeone may take that action for us.
ddress correspondence to: Anthony N. DeMaria, MD,
ACC, Editor-in-Chief, Journal of the American College of Car-
iology, 3655 Nobel Drive, Suite 400, San Diego, California
2122.
EFERENCES
. U.S. General Accounting Office. Specialty hospitals: information on
national market share, physician ownership and patients served. Publ.
No. GAO-03-683R Washington, DC: GAO, April 18, 2003.
. Casalino LP, Devers KJ, Brewster LR. Focused factories? Physician-
owned specialty facilities. Health Aff (Millwood) 2003;22:56–67.
. Dobson A. A comparative study of patient severity, quality of care, and
community impact at MedCath heart hospitals. Lewin.Com, May
2003.
. Voelker R. Specialty hospitals generate revenue and controversy. JAMA
2003;289:409–11.
